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

Washington Wire

"I get discouraged . . ."

EISENHOWER was as mad when he answered Sarah McClendon's question last week as we have ever seen him. He was so eager to slap her down that he took an all-out position on getting Congressional approval before sending US troops to the Middle East. Sarah McClendon may have altered history.

It happened at the press conference. These have been telescoped into half an hour once a week (FDR had two-a-week before the war; no time limit). With 219 reporters on hand it is hard to get recognition. Some vainly rise and sit and get all their week's knee-bending calisthenics done trying to catch the President's eye.

When the President gives the nod the custom is that the reporter first gives his name and paper—a new, dampening effect on reporters who know the TV cameras are grinding away and that his remarks will be recorded for publishers. These rules have two effects: they silence the timid and encourage exhibitionists.

No conference is complete without a question from a woman reporter. Last week the redoubtable May Craig did not rise. She may have sensed the President's mood. Sarah McClendon of the *El Paso Times,* however, rose repeatedly. No recognition. Mounting tension. A duel of wills. Finally Sarah McClendon simply popped up and delivered her question anyway, with a courage—or insensitivity—few men could have mustered. It was a good question in view of the deepening Mediterranean crisis, though it had been asked at various times in the past: Would Eisenhower use our Marines in the Middle East without asking the approval of Congress first?

The rash reporter had won her right to be heard, had defeated the President in a game where he made all the rules, and left him angrier than we have ever seen him. "I get discouraged sometimes here!" he ejaculated. He started again, flushed, paused—continued with hands clenching and unclenching. Reporters, mindful of his heart, watched with awe.

The President's eyes are a little reddened by conjunctivitis. In his wrath he is a formidable sight. His answer was, in effect, a stronger reaffirmation of his self-imposed limitation against sending troops into battle without specific Congressional approval; a position inferentially critical of Truman's quick action in Korea. To some this interpretation of the Constitution seems a dubious restriction on White House authority, typical of a tendency to yield leadership. The issue is red hot because Britain is now desperately trying to get advance United States commitment to act quickly with her in the Middle East if war starts.

Off to Georgia

REPORTERS sometimes get the frustrated feeling at the President's press conference that he does not keep track of what is going on. Asked last week about the Wisconsin primaries, the President prefaced his remarks with "Actually I haven't seen the final figures"; asked to comment on the latest Dulles statement on Russia, he replied, "Well, I don't know exactly what the Secretary of State said . . . "; asked about Sherman Adams' attack on the Democratic record in Congress, he began "I don't know under what circumstances Mr. Adams made such a statement . . . "; asked about Iceland's strategic value in relation to Russia he said that he had not given "my personal attention" to "this particular question." In fairness it should be said that the President gave answers in each case, though not always precisely to the question asked. Doesn't Eisenhower want to know, and don't they tell him? It's hard to say.

There is a theory in Washington that the details of being President bore Eisenhower. He reserves his decisions for the big issues. These finally reach him at the top staff level. He does not follow them in the papers. There is also a delegation of powers by the President, a growing void of new international ideas as the reservoir left him by Roosevelt and Truman is pumped dry. For the US, things have gone badly in Iceland and Ceylon; the Mediterranean is now a powder keg; the farm bill at home has reached a crisis . . . And President Eisenhower leaves for a week's golfing in Georgia.

"Do-nothing" Congress?

CONGRESS and politics will come to a boil together in the next three months. On the farm bill we don't see quite how the President can square approval with his previous utterances, but maybe if he remembers that a genuine farm revolt seems in the making in the Midwest he will swallow it. Democrats are getting ready to push social security extension—their chief bid for liberal support. There will be a highway bill, too—Congress will move much faster from now on.

Republicans aren't in a good position to push their "do-nothing" charge against Congress. Often they are the ones who have opposed the Eisenhower program. Note, for example, the vote in the House Ways and Means Committee favorably reporting out the Eisenhower recommendation that we join the International Office for Trade Co-operation—an important vehicle for tariff reform. Did the Republicans back their President? No, they voted 6 to 4 against the bill; it was the Democrats who saved the Eisenhower project, 13 to 1.

The truth is that Congress has *not* done much. The nation is happy with "peace and prosperity" (all but the farmers, that is) and the mood of the country is mild, moderate and quiescent. In these circumstances Congress hasn't passed many bills because the country didn't want many bills passed; the brakes on action have been applied as often by Republicans as Democrats.

Notes

AS THE SUICIDAL Stevenson-Kefauver duel deepens, desperate Democratic leaders are re-assessing the assets of Gov. Averell Harriman and Sen. Stuart Symington; Harriman is scanned particularly at the moment. . . . The first head-on Stevenson-Kefauver clash comes in Florida, May 29; four years ago Kefauver got 43.6 percent of Florida's vote away from Sen. Richard Russell (D, Ga.), an extraordinary showing; it will be a tough battle for Stevenson.

T.R.B.

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The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

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The Likelihood of War

THE ODDS on a full-scale Arab-Israeli war are now quoted at 50-50 in both Washington and London, not because either Arab or Jew has grown more eager for a fight, but because Russian intentions have changed. Heretofore, both American and British negotiators had believed that the Russians, by their Egyptian arms deal, wanted only to stir up trouble in the Middle East, short of war. Now, it is plausible to believe the Soviets may have decided that a small, Korea-type war is to its advantage.

A local war would presumably be kept in bounds by effective UN truce arrangements. Yet it could inflame religious and nationalist passions throughout the Muslim world, mobilize against Israel all armies on the Arabian peninsula as well as token troops from as far west as Morocco and Muslim legionnaires from as far east as Indonesia. Such a war would end with another UN truce line, and the Soviet Union would profit by the political after-effects, after-effects of the sort that followed World War II.

Japanese fighting in Southeast Asia, for example, advanced by at least a decade the independence of India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and Vietnam. The German invasion of North Africa did the same for Italian Libya and is still affecting French North Africa. Political upsurges brought the ousting of many foreign corporations, the end of foreign currency controls, and any symbol of 19th Century Western colonialism.

In the Middle East, the backlash of war could jeopardize, and possibly eliminate, British and American oil interests in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; remnants of British currency controls in Iraq and Jordan, and all British and US military alliances in the region. The "incidents" by which such events might be brought about and the Mossadeghs to carry them forward would be easy enough for Communist agents to contrive, just as the war itself could be touched off by some Communist-planned atrocity when the Arabs are ready.

The Big Three of the NATO powers—Britain, France and the US—have reacted to this Middle East crisis with widely differing emphases. Britain has pressed for joint military action which would enable the three powers to intervene with their own forces in the first 24 hours of fighting. French Premier Guy Mollet has advocated direct talks with the Russians to try for some political agreement before the war starts. The US pushed through the UN Security Council the plan for Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to undertake his present fact-finding trip.

The US reliance on the UN seems to us both the most realistic deterrent to war and the most practical device for maneuvering the Russians into backing any UN cease-fire order. The Soviet cannot easily veto UN peace efforts without forfeiting much of their recent propaganda gains as "apostles of peace." It is highly doubtful whether they would risk the loss.

Correspondence

► *Stevenson vs. Kefauver*

SIRS:

I cannot tell whether your esteemed correspondent who wrote of Senator Kefauver's visit to Los Angeles and environs intended to make the Senator sound like Pappy O'Daniel or Wendell Willkie. The truth is that I have failed to hear those endearing errors in grammar of which he writes. It seems to me that for a man who speaks generally off the cuff Senator Kefauver is rather ramarkable for keeping his sentences straight.

And as for "Yew-nited States," I am puzzled. Does your correspondent mean that Senator Kefauver does not say "Uhn-ited States"?

I note that your correspondent is cautious in delivering any predictions of his own, mentioning only the opinions of

(Continued on page 23)

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Wisconsin Puzzle

POLITICAL reporters who covered the Presidential primary in Wisconsin April 3 agreed about one thing: rarely has there been an election so hard to interpret with any degree of certainty. Every rural area in the state showed Democratic gains, most of them substantial, but this had been expected. What had not been foreseen was that the city vote, in normally Democratic territory, should shift almost as sharply toward President Eisenhower. In every city for which there were figures available, the President ran more strongly against Kefauver than he had in 1952 against Adlai E. Stevenson.

Stevenson had carried Milwaukee against Mr. Eisenhower in 1952 with a margin of 9,000 votes. Last week Mr. Eisenhower drew 9,700 more than Kefauver. In Milwaukee county (all urban), the President increased his winning margin from 15,000 to 25,000. The Democratic vote fell off most significantly in labor wards. One southside ward which gave Stevenson 71 percent of its vote in 1952 gave Kefauver only 63 percent. In West Allis, an industrial suburb, the Democratic vote fell from 52 percent to 46 percent. In Cudahy, a similar area, the drop was 62 percent to 52 percent. The sharpest drops came, however, in Negro wards, where a 76-percent vote for Stevenson fell to 58 percent for Kefauver. The vote was light in these wards, and the percentage drop may be misleading for the wards involved have been redistricted and no exact comparison is possible. But there was no mistaking the trend.

Observers guessed that the drop had something to do with the school-segregation fight raging in the South; some Negro leaders here have threatened to cross to the GOP if the Democrats continue to co-exist with Southern Democrats like Sen. James Eastland (Miss.). Some of the shift may have been part of the labor trend, for most Negroes here are industrial workers. Numerically, the Negro vote is not important in Milwaukee, but Democrats feared that this might indicate a movement that would be fatal to Democratic chances in some other Northern cities.

Statewide, the Democrats showed a three-percent gain because of the strength of the shift of the farm vote. But Democrats who took a long-range view were not cheered by the results. The exchange of city votes which have stuck closely to the Democrats for some years for a share of the notoriously fickle farm vote was a doubtful bargain.

For liberals, the most satisfying result of the Wisconsin elections was the decisive victory of Socialist Mayor Frank P. Zeidler in Milwaukee's nonpartisan mayoralty contest. It demonstrated that the voters would not accept a McCarthylike campaign of vilification. The two most important weapons of Zeidler's opposition were a newspaper campaign determined to show that Socialism and Communism were identical, and a whispering campaign that sought to implant the idea that Zeidler was a "nigger lover." There were signs in the late stages of the campaign that these tactics were backfiring, and so they did.

Subversion and State Laws

IN WHAT will be widely considered another token of judicial thaw, the Supreme Court has set aside Pennsylvania's conviction of Steve Nelson under the state's "little Smith Act." (Nelson has already been convicted by the United States for violating the "big" Smith Act, and neither the propriety of that conviction nor the validity of that Act is affected by the present decision). In effect the Court has invalidated sedition laws of the several states (some 42 states have such laws), at least to the extent that they make it a crime to advocate the overthrow by force and violence of the government of the United States. Although the Court did not precisely say so, the tenor of its opinion suggests that state laws may survive if they merely prohibit sedition against the government of a state. The opinion was by Chief Justice Warren; Justices Reed, Burton and Minton dissented.

It has long been the law that if Congress indicates an intent to preclude state legislation on a matter of paramount federal concern and competence, state laws on the same subject will be swept aside, whether in conflict with the federal statute or not. The Court found the necessary Congressional purpose, in this case, in the comprehensive nature of the Smith Act and other anti-subversive legislation, as well as in potential conflict between federal and state enforcement programs.

One may doubt whether the Congressmen who passed the Smith Act and subsequent anti-Communist legislation actually intended the result the Court reaches; and if Congress *is* dissatisfied with the result, it can simply

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pass a law reversing the Courts' interpretation. It seems likely that Congress will do so, for 28 state attorneys general, as well as the United States Attorney General, filed briefs in the Supreme Court arguing against the ruling the Court finally reached.

Even if Congress should act to reverse it, the Court's decision will have some effect. Several prosecutions are pending under a number of state sedition acts. These must now be dropped, and it is doubtful whether Congress can revive them retroactively. In any event the Court performs one of its most characteristic and useful functions when it, in effect, tosses the ball back to Congress. It does not deny power to the political arm of the government to deal with the problem of Communist conspiracy. Rather, the Court insists that if Congress wants a certain result it must say so specifically. As a consequence, the desirability of the legislation may be more thoughtfully considered. And, at least political responsibility for the result will be definitely fixed.

No United Front

THE NEW freedom allowed Communists under the Khrushchev line would be more convincing if just one single Communist Party in the world were permitted to reject it. In fact the Communist Parties outside Russia are lining up to endorse the new orthodoxy with the same old "outer-directed" subservience. West of the Iron Curtain, the new line means nothing more than a return to the policies of a United or Popular Front.

In Britain the Communist Party has just finished its most disheartening Congress since the war. Party membership is down to 34,000, and direct Communist influence spreads little further. Nevertheless, the leadership maintained its world record of surviving every shift in Comintern tactics over the last 30 years without a purge. Not one of the 42 recommended candidates for the executive committee failed to obtain election. The public sessions were largely filled by a weary reiteration of demands for a united front with the Labour Party.

The Communists got their reply a day after their Congress ended. One of Britain's largest unions, the Shopworkers, which has generally stood Left of Center on political issues, rejected all contact with the Communist Party almost unanimously. There is no doubt that the Shopworkers' lead will be followed by all the other unions which are not actually under Communist control. Indeed all the socialist parties of Europe agree on this issue. At the March meeting of the Socialist International they rejected Communist collaboration on any terms.

Yet it would be dangerous to deny that many Socialists who will not sign political pacts with the Communist Party in their own country may apply different standards when they have to choose their path in world affairs. In diplomacy one is apt to judge one's allies more harshly than one's enemies, and recent criticisms of American policy made by French Socialist Ministers like Guy Mollet and Antoine Pinay have found a grateful echo in the British Labour Party. The lack of leadership in Washington and London represents a far greater danger to the unity of the West than the new look in Moscow.

When the Snow Melts

THAT THERE will be a major flood in the Pacific Northwest this year is beyond doubt. Whether it will be as bad as the record flood of 1894, or merely as bad as the 1948 flood will depend on rains and snows yet to come and on the rate of snow melt. The 1948 flood wiped out the town of Vanport, Oregon, killed 38 people and did about $100 million worth of damages.

The region is hardly better prepared today to prevent such a disaster than it was in 1948. That flood led to swift preparation (on paper) by the Army Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies of a "Main Control Plan." Under that plan new reservoir projects on the upper Columbia and its major tributaries would serve both flood control and hydroelectric power purposes. In combination with a system of levees along the lower river, the reservoirs would minimize flood damages.

Not one of the flood-control projects proposed in the Main Control Plan has been built to date. Those projects on which construction has been started since 1948—Chief Joe, The Dalles, Ice Harbor—add little to the control of floods. Nor have the levees been brought up to recommended specifications. Despite improvements since 1948, General E. C. Itschner of the Army Corps of Engineers recently referred to the protection afforded by some of the levees as "problematical." The federal government has spent none of the funds at its disposal for the strengthening of levees.

The Administration's "Partnership" policy (which waits for "local initiative" to provide power supply) has yet to produce a single kilowatt anywhere. It has yet to produce even the minutest contribution to flood control. In fact, the present plans of the Corps of Engineers, as outlined last week to a Congressional committee, contemplate substituting for every one of the multi-purpose projects formerly included in their original federal Main Control Plan, dime-store, privately sponsored local projects which would not make full use of the most important Northwest damsites. They no longer apply the test of engineering-economic feasibility to a project but only that of "political feasibility." Or, in the words of General Itschner to his staff in 1955, the Columbia River program should be revised so as to become "fully acceptable to all interests concerned."

The Army Engineers are confident that they have the Columbia River under control. The people of the Pacific Northwest, less confident, are laying in sandbags.

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Can Egypt Be Appeased?

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER left Washington for his third vacation this winter without explaining his bewildering admission to a press conference that he knew nothing about the urgent message on the Middle East crisis sent him by Sir Anthony Eden. The world, therefore, remains in doubt as to whether the US, like Britain, has become sufficiently disturbed by recent actions of Colonel Nasser to think twice before investing too much confidence in Egypt as an ally. The provocations for such a reappraisal, if it is taking place, are abundant.

When, in July, 1952, a military junta overthrew King Farouk, its action was generally welcomed, for corruption under the deposed monarch had been widespread; conditions of anarchy (culminating in the "Black Saturday") had assumed dangerous proportions. Even the Communists welcomed the intervention of the army; they were soon to change their line, however, and for three years, up to the Czechoslovak arms deal, Naguib and Nasser were "Fascist hangmen" as far as the Communists were concerned. But otherwise there was much optimism in Egypt and elsewhere; a "Kemalist solution" for Egypt seemed a distinct possibility; in the Israeli parliament Mr. Ben-Gurion expressed his hope for a speedy peace treaty with Egypt.

Under the Naguib-Nasser regime "feudal" became the worst invective, and the fat and boorish landowners the favorite target of Egyptian cartoonists. The political notions of these young army officers were extremely vague; they were not Socialists though most called themselves so; many had a record of Fascist and Communist fellow-travelling (in that chronological order). They believed that the country would have to be given more efficient government, that the army should be strengthened, that certain social reforms would have to be carried out. But they had no knowledge of the working of the modern state and tried their luck rather clumsily, adopting as far as possible army methods to civilian life and exploiting the army mystique in every area. There were undoubted achievements, from the deposition of King Farouk to the agrarian reform (however fragmentary) and the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood which had been a purely destructive factor in Egyptian politics. But the new regime raised far more hopes than it could possibly fulfil. The workers and peasants expected immediate improvements, and the intelligentsia (especially the students) had hoped for more than obligatory, universal military training.

Weeks and months went by and life was little different for the *Fellaheen*, the worker, the urban middle class. There was, of course, a new style, not dissimilar to that of the French Revolution: Patriotism, the appeal for unity against separatist trends, brave phrases about social equality. But style, after all, is not enough. To recruit mass support Colonel Nasser established a state party, the "Liberation movement." Within a few weeks, it claimed more than five million members, making it one of the largest political parties in the world outside the Iron Curtain. But, in reality, the "movement" never became a political factor of any consequence.

By early in 1955 the junta, headed by Colonel Nasser, had succeeded in downing all its competitors: the Wafd and the other political parties were dissolved, the officer corps had been purged of deviators from General Naguib downward. But by last year, it had become clear that the opportunity for carrying through far-reaching domestic reforms had been missed. There was no lack of good will, but good will, like style, was not enough. With the dissolution of the old political parties the military movement had spent most of its momentum; there was to be no Egyptian Kemalism; for once Kemal Ataturk had won his battle against foreign intervention, he began to carry out his program of internal reform; he did not engage in vainglorious dreams about the reconquest of the old Ottoman Empire. For Ataturk the primacy of domestic policy was self-evident. Colonel Nasser, on the other hand, was to follow a different course, opting, as he did, for the primacy of foreign policy.

A CURIOUS situation had arisen in which a country like Egypt, however backward and internally weak, could almost attain great power status—at least temporarily. During the last 12 or 18 months Colonel Nasser and his colleagues have had several important successes. England agreed to evacuate the Suez base; Iraq, Egypt's main competitor in the Arab world, has been effectively isolated; Israel has been put under great pressure as a result of Egypt's purchase of arms from the Communists; unscrupulous broadcasts of the "Voice of the Arabs" radio station have hammered home, day after day, Egypt's support for all anti-Western movements from Morocco to Pakistan to Kenya. Algerian rebels, according to French sources, call Gamal Nasser "Big Brother"; Bahraini newspapers overflow with praise of "Giant Salah-ad-Din Nasser"—an allusion to the great ruler who united the Arabs in the fight against the crusaders. Western and Eastern diplomats stumble over each other in their offers of assistance to Egypt and their courtship of the country which has emerged as the leader of a new axis in the Middle East.

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However, Colonel Nasser's successes to date are, we are told, merely the first act in the drama of glory which is to come. The Cairo press envisages an Egyptian empire surpassing the realm of the Pharaoh's and the conquests of Mehemed Ali. Egypt as the leader of all African national movements down to the Sambesi is one of the elementary articles of faith: it is the historic mission of Egypt to "liberate Africa" and to gain a supremacy similar to the one attained by China in the Far East. War against Israel is a very minor consideration to ambitions which now span whole continents: "a single Egyptian *moudirieh* [province] will be able to destroy Israel." The present Iraqi Government is to be overthrown; other reluctant Arab states (Lebanon and Jordan) will be drawn into a new axis headed by Egypt, to be joined at a later date by Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. The West will be brought to its knees by cutting its fuel lifeline: Cairo radio calls for the removal of American and British oil companies from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: Aden, a British crown colony, is to be liberated and the Red Sea closed to Western vessels.

All this and more is vividly described in detail in the leading Cairo weeklies, such as *Al Tahrir, Rose al Yousef, Al Mussawar* (from which we have quoted). Close observers of the Cairo scene, not unsympathetic to Colonel Nasser, already report that Spain and Sicily are included in the blueprint for the new Egyptian empire (*London Times,* March 19, 1956).

There is of course an element of fantasy in all that. But it would be dangerous to dismiss it as the harmless product of the imagination of people living in a dream world. Chances that the Cairo junta will ever achieve its foreign political aims are indeed dim: a minimum social and economic basis is needed on which to build empires, and this basis simply does not exist in Egypt: Colonel Nasser may profit from studying the lesson of fascism in Italy. But even if the Egyptian attempt to attain great power status should fail, as most believe that it will, it may in the process cause immeasurable damage.

IN THESE circumstances there are two schools of thinking —diametrically opposed—as to how the West should handle Colonel Nasser. The one school, to which, according to many reports, Mr. Henry Byroade, US Ambassador in Cairo belongs, argues that Colonel Nasser and his colleagues are essentially reasonable men, mainly interested in domestic problems. The main obstacles to understanding between the US and Cairo are (a) the existence of Israel, and (b) French and English policies in North Africa and the Middle East. Support for Israel has been a mistake anyway, they say, the sooner the Jewish state is reduced or disappears, the better. America should also support Egypt's aims elsewhere in the Arab world and North Africa: these are, after all, just national aspirations; Western policy should support national movements throughout Africa and non-Communist Asia. Once these disputes are satisfactorily settled, Colonel Nasser will calm down; his more ambitious projects should not be taken too seriously; it will be possible to restrain the junta and direct its activities into more peaceful and constructive channels. There may be risks involved in such a course of action, but the only alternative (according to them) is to antagonize the Cairo junta completely, to push it into the Communist camp, thereby risking the eventual loss of the whole Middle East.

SUCH views deserve to be closely scrutinized. Of course, support of national movements in non-Communist Asia and Africa is an admirable principle; if Western statesmen had provided a larger measure of political sympathy and economic help for countries such as India, Burma or Ceylon, the position of the West would be better than it is now. But very much depends on the manner in which support is given; the recent grant by the World Bank for the Aswan Dam is a perfect example of how it should not be done. For this grant was made out of the fear that Russia would steal a march upon the West, and there is an Arabic proverb to the effect that "if you give to a fool, he will say—this is because they are afraid of me." Western help to Egypt in these circumstances has been accepted as a matter of course, as some form of indemnification for the many "sins of the West." Not only cynics claim now that the only way to get speedy American help is to blackmail the West with the threat to play with the Russians.

But the ill-timed grant of Western economic help is trivial compared with the basic mistake committed by those who advocate Western backing for the political aims of Colonel Nasser: the equation of Asian and Middle Eastern nationalism. There is a profound difference between two. In Southeast Asia (as in Turkey, and possibly in Tunisia now) the struggle for independence went hand in hand with a general national renaissance. Indians and Pakistanis may quarrel over Kashmir, Indonesia may demand Dutch New Guinea, but territorial aggrandizement on a vast scale is not contemplated by any of these countries: they are not empire-minded.

Egypt at the present stage of its development is "unappeasable"—to use a harsh word. Western collaboration with countries like India, Burma or Ceylon is possible, indeed highly desirable, because the aim of these governments is to strengthen their newly-won political independence, develop their countries, and have peace. The West has no other aims than these in Asia. No such common ground exists with Egypt's present rulers, whose single preoccupation is empire, who wish to prevent the West from taking part in the economic development of Africa, who wish to cut off the supply of oil—not just to cut the profits of the oil companies, who want to "liberate," for all we know, the European parts of former Arab, Saracen and Mameluke empires.

WALTER Z. LAQUEUR

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Will the Farmers Beat Eisenhower?

by HALDORE HANSON

FROM the shaky end of a limb, some political statisticians began forecasting last December that a revolt among farm voters could produce a long-shot Democratic victory next November, even over President Eisenhower.

They based their projection on the size of the farm swing-vote in Harry Truman's upset victory in 1948, and they offered three premises for a repeat performance in 1956. First, the farmer is mad. Second, the farmer blames his troubles on Ike. Third, farm prices will skid still lower during record fall marketings of cattle and hogs next September, within 60 days of the election.

When such forecasts first appeared four months ago, they may have been wishful thinking. Today, judging by Midwest opinion polls, primary election voting, and a sampling of Congressional mail, a major switch of Republican votes to the Democrats in the farm belt is no longer questioned. Some careful vote analysts, after receiving the April farm forecasts which indicate beef will slump next October to its lowest price in 10 years, are quietly predicting a switch of half the farm belt states to the Democrats.

The argument of the analysts runs like this. In 1952 President Eisenhower carried all 12 of the Midwest states, shown on the map opposite, and the three adjoining farm states of Colorado, Idaho and Oklahoma. These 15 states represent 155 electoral votes. Four years earlier Harry Truman won 120 of these electoral votes. These are the swing states that elect or defeat candidates.

Assume, the analysts suggest, that the Democrats hold the 89 electoral votes captured by Adlai Stevenson in 1952. Add to this the 120 farm-state votes which Truman carried in 1948, and also the four Southern states which went to Eisenhower in 1952 (Florida, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia). This adds up 89 plus 120 plus 57 for a total of 266. That is the exact number required to elect a President.

Under these assumptions the Republicans could take New York, Pennsylvania, California and Michigan, and still lose the election. Or conversely, if the Democrats carry any one of the big industrial states, they could lose several states to the Dixiecrats, and still recover the White House.

Evidence to prove that events in 1956 are moving toward this political outcome is admittedly fragmentary, but the evidence is growing and is impressive when set against the pattern of 1948.

In 1948 farm prices began to drop in January, and the decline continued for two years, until reversed by the Korean War boom. Farm income dropped 10 percent in the election year of 1948. Several developments caused the farmer to blame his troubles on the Republicans. For example, in the spring of 1948 the Republican-controlled 80th Congress passed a law forbidding the Commodity Credit Corporation from building any more government storage bins for grain. When the bumper crops of 1948 were harvested—more than a billion bushels of wheat in the spring, more than 3 billion bushels of corn in the fall—there was not enough storage space, and since a farmer can get a price-support loan on his grain only if it is properly stored, most farmers could not qualify. Their crops were sold for cash causing the price of corn to skid from $1.78 a bushel in September, 1948, to $1.38 in October, to $1.21 in November. That was election month.

IN THE midst of this disastrous grain market slide, Harry Truman travelled tirelessly around the Midwest, denouncing the 80th Congress. One of his noted speeches of the campaign was delivered at the National Plowing Contest in Dexter, Iowa, on Sept. 18. He told an audience of 90,000, gathered in a cornfield:

> These Republican gluttons of privileges are cold men. . . . They have already done their best to keep price supports from working. Many growers have sold wheat this summer at less than support prices, because they could not find proper storage. . . . How many times do you have to be hit on the head before you find out what's hitting you? . . . This Republican Congress has already struck a pitchfork in the farmer's back.

When the voting was over, Harry Truman owed his re-election to the windfall of farm votes in the six corn belt states of Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri.

Compare this pattern, then, with 1956. Farm prices have been declining for four years—that is, since the last year of the Democratic Administration, but at an accelerating pace during the Eisenhower years. In 1955 farm prices dropped more than in any other year of this century. Hogs dropped within two Eisenhower years from a high of 25c a pound liveweight to less than 10c at the close of 1955, which is actually below the break-

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even point. Since then hog prices have recovered moderately this spring, because of scarcity, but another big run of hogs to market, normally accompanied by a price slump, will begin in September.

Fat beef cattle are another principal form in which Midwest farmers send their corn crop to market. Cattle dropped during the Eisenhower years from a high of about 38c a pound liveweight to a present top of about 22c. This year farmers have put a record number of cattle into the feedlot, partly as an escape from the disastrous hog market. Those cattle will begin to flood the market in September. By election day the top price of fat cattle will sink, according to present forecasts, to the lowest top price since V-J day, probably 18 or 19c a pound. That is below the break-even point for the farmers who do the feeding.

Thus the election campaign of 1956 will be fought against a background of acute farm distress in the corn belt, just as it was in 1948.

The farmer who feeds his corn neither to cattle nor hogs can get a price support loan from the government. There will be no acute shortage of storage space as in 1948. But the politics of the government farm program will take another form. If President Eisenhower should veto the 1956 farm bill, Democratic candidates will blame the President for the existing low level of crop loans. And if the President should sign the 1956 bill, including higher price supports, Democrats will be quick to tell the farmer: "It was we who wrote into the bill a billion dollars in additional supports. It was President Eisenhower who denounced the bill. It was Vice President Nixon who cast the deciding Senate vote against 90 percent supports."

The politics of farm prices has begun to change the farmer's vote, seven months before the general election. This was brought into the open in the Minnesota primary of March 20. Total Democratic votes in the primary exceeded Republican votes on a ratio better than 2-to-1, whereas President Eisenhower had carried the state in the 1952 election by a margin of 5-to-4. To some extent the percentages are affected by the fact that President Eisenhower did no campaigning in Minnesota, whereas both Stevenson and Kefauver travelled extensively in the state.

Nevertheless, the genuineness of the shift away from the Republicans was borne out by a *Minneapolis Tribune* poll taken in mid-March but published after the election. In a "trial heat" Minnesota farmers favored Kefauver over President Eisenhower 52 to 45 percent, while in the cities Ike led 56 to 40 percent.

The *Wall Street Journal*, after interviewing Minnesota farmers for a week following the election, concluded that three out of every five who voted for Eisenhower in 1952 would vote Democratic this November.

Farmers gave various explanations for their political shift. A Blue Earth, Minnesota, corn-hog farmer, Richard Quaday, told one of the *Journal* reporters: "This is a real farmers' rebellion against Ike, his hired man Benson, and their farm program. You bet I'm voting Democratic this fall. I never knew I would hurt myself so much when I voted Republican in 1952."

Another Blue Earth farmer, Francis O'Neil, commented at his 240-acre farm: "I switched over from Ike to the Democrats last October when I got as low as $9.25 a hundred for 250 hogs I marketed."

A farmer from Ortonville, unloading hogs at the South St. Paul yards, told the reporter: "I don't know what some folks got against Mr. Benson. I wish I had a hired hand that good. He does everything the boss tells him to." This farmer said he voted for Ike in 1952, for Kefauver in the 1956 primary, and will support any Democratic candidate in November.

In the Wisconsin primary of April 3 farm opposition again hurt President Eisenhower and helped Senator Kefauver. Kefauver made his largest gains among the corn-hog farmers along the Iowa and Illinois borders, and among the smaller dairy farmers in the northern part of the state. The fact that cyclones struck the state on



Those of the 12 Midwestern farm states carried by the Republican Party in 1948 (left) and 1952 (center) are shaded on the maps above.

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election day held down the rural vote considerably.

A clearer indication of how Wisconsin farmers feel about the administration farm program was presented in a state-wide poll of the *Wisconsin Agriculturalist* on March 1, a month before the primary. Directed only to farmers, the poll obtained the following opinion on how Secretary Benson is doing.

	July 1953	Sept. 1954	Sept. 1955	Jan. 1956
Doing good job	30%	14	12	4
Doing fair job	42	38	34	26
Doing poor job	13	37	45	55
No answer	15	11	9	15

The poll indicates a rapid increase in hostility during the closing months of 1955 when hog prices dropped to their lowest level since World War II.

In North Dakota the decision of the Non-partisan League to break away from the Republican Party after a 4-decade affiliation and file this year with the Democrats, an action announced March 29, was prompted in part by the bitterness of farmers within the League.

In the same state a poll of Stutsman County taken by the *Jamestown* (N.D.) *Sun*, in connection with the regular township elections on March 20, asked this question: "If the following men were the Republican and Democratic nominees for President, which one in the group would you vote for?" The results:

(A) Eisenhower 225	(B) Eisenhower 145
Stevenson 293	Kefauver 446

In 1952 this same county favored Eisenhower over Stevenson by more than 2-to-1, and even in 1948 it supported Dewey rather than Truman by a closer margin.

C. J. Barry, administrative assistant to Representative Usher L. Burdick (R, N.D.), offered this comment on the Stutsman County poll.

> We know there are plenty of Republicans planning to vote Democratic. In six years of reading a Congressman's mail, I have never seen people so mad. I can recognize a phony protest when I see one, but these people are really heated up. We can only hope that the voters will not take out their anger on Republicans like Mr. Burdick who have fought for higher supports and against the Administration program.

In Iowa a February poll by the *Des Moines Sunday Register* reported nearly two-thirds of the Iowans on farms and in small towns, and just over half of those in cities, feel the Democratic Party best serves the interests of farmers. A poll of *Wallace's Farmer* published February 18 showed only 15 percent of Iowa farm operators think the Eisenhower farm program will bring any improvement in conditions in 1956.

On a national scale a Gallup Poll of January 18, 1956, asked farmers only: "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the Republican Administration is handling the problem of farm prices and supports?" The replies:

	Jan. 1956	Oct. 1955
Satisfied	24%	30
Dissatisfied	62	43
No opinion	14	27

The notable hardening of farm opinion against the Administration in the last three months of 1955 is consistent with the results of most farm belt polls, and coincided with the hog market slump.

The farmers' opposition to Eisenhower farm policies is likely to have more effect on the Presidential race than upon Congressional elections, since the majority of Senators and Representatives from farm states have opposed the Administration farm program and championed higher supports. The same was not true in 1948, when Democrats captured 35 House seats from Republicans in the Midwest farm states, including six in Illinois, five in Indiana, two in Michigan, three in Minnesota, 8 in Missouri, one in Nebraska, 8 in Ohio, two in Wisconsin

The *Wall Street Journal* interviewers in Minnesota reported that farmers who plan to switch their Presidential votes to the Democrats show little inclination to vote against rural Republican Representatives, all of whom opposed the Administration farm policy.

The New Republic recently asked the principal farm editor in each of 12 Midwest states to express his personal opinion on how many Congressmen would be defeated next fall because of farmer opposition. Their replies indicated the possibility of two or three Republican losses in Illinois, three in Indiana, one in North Dakota, one in Kansas and two in Iowa.

ALL this evidence on the farm revolt should suggest an answer to the question: Will 1956 prove a sequel to 1948? The best answer at this time is:

In 1948 Harry Truman could not have won without the swing-votes of the farmers, which gave him six swing-states in the corn belt. Even there he could not have won, despite his furious campaigning, without the disastrous slump in corn prices during the 60 days before election. Farmers were hurting worst at the time they entered the voting booth.

What of today? In April, 1956, the evidence that farmers are revolting against the Eisenhower Administration is not sufficiently strong to suggest a national Democratic victory if the election were held today. That was the conclusion of all the farm editors polled by this magazine. It is undoubtedly correct.

But the falling of the second shoe immediately before election—that is, the predicted drop of cattle prices below the break-even level, and the seasonal decline of hogs to a point approaching last winter's disaster—would recreate the hot anger of 1948. And if farm forecasters are right in their count of cattle now fattening and sows now farrowing for the fall market, a political time fuse is already burning.

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An Agrarian Tide — Standing Still

by DALE KRAMER

AN AMAZING thing has happened in Iowa. It was the more startling to me, perhaps, because I was sitting quietly here in Sigourney last summer writing a book about the old agrarian tides when, lo and behold, there was the sound of roiling waters some hundred miles to the west. The noises were strikingly like those made by the Grangers in the 1870s, with attacks on big business and especially the monopolies. The speakers might have been Populists asleep since the Nineties, except that instead of free silver coinage and greenbacks they demanded high pegged prices on hogs and cattle, which are not directly supported in the government farm program.

I knew—and so did everybody else who has studied farmers' movements—by the size of the crowds that the commotion was significant. Five hundred to a thousand farmers were crowding the livestock auction barns which nowadays dot Iowa. Farmers do not come out to protest meetings unless hopping mad. At first the speakers were young farmers long on anger and short on oratorical experience, plus a feed salesman and an amiable grain speculator.

Then out of the past strode old Dan Turner, former Governor, pushing four score but laden with brimstone and bucolic wit. In his day Turner's political luck was bad. Though somewhat in the tradition of George W. Norris and Smith Brookhart and other farm bloc "Sons of the Wild Jackass," he had the misfortune to be Governor between 1930 and 1932 when Milo Reno was whipping up a farm rebellion. He called out the militia to suppress demonstrations, and he couldn't or wouldn't get far enough away from Herbert Hoover to escape oblivion in the first Roosevelt landslide. He failed to come back. But, a big landowner himself, he had a massive contempt for Ezra Benson which was very effective in arousing farmers.

In early September a dozen or so farmers who had been active in the protest meetings sat down in Corning —Turner's home town in southwestern Iowa—and founded the National Farm Organization. Its chief demands were for "floors" under livestock prices—specifically $20 a hundredweight for hogs and $30 for cattle. Dan Turner and the other orators spelled these out as production payments, with one price to consumers and another to farmers, the government making up the difference. If aware they were talking about the old Brannan Plan they didn't say so. They did, however, advocate production controls to go along with cash payments.

Southwestern Iowa and northwestern Missouri had suffered drought for a number of years. The NFO spread quickly at $1 a membership. The question remained whether it would move out of the drought region. The hog market gave a quick answer. The big market runs are in October and November and December. A Chicago market of $18 or even $17 a hundredweight would not have hurt farmers too badly. The market plunged to under $11.

As it happened, the test immediately outside the drought area came in the county of which Sigourney is the seat. A couple of dozen farmers met and arranged to bring in Dan Turner. A thousand farmers—nearly half the total in the county—packed the hall for him. Five days later, as farmers drove their school districts, nearly two-thirds of all the farmers had joined the NFO. The tide swept north and spread outward. Nothing like its spontaneity had been seen since the Grangers rose in the Seventies. The sweep through Missouri was nearly as rapid.

The pace was slower in Minnesota and the Dakotas and Wisconsin, partly because the Farmers Union, with a more or less similar program, is strong in those states. The NFO made some headway in Illinois to the east and Nebraska and Kansas to the west. At last accounting the membership was about 140,000, most of it in Iowa and Missouri.

THE drop in the hog market triggered the floodgates. Cattle fell, too, and that dairy farmers are not so happy as Secretary Benson imagines is indicated by the recent strike of milk producers in Michigan. The cotton and wheat farmers were viewing with apprehension the lowering of supports under President Eisenhower's flexible program. Yet the cause of real terror in the minds of farmers was rising costs against falling prices. A simple figure tells the story. Cost of production has increased fourfold since 1940, has doubled since the close of World War II.

Behind the anger at the market drop was the sudden realization that the whole agricultural industry is in an untenable position. The older farmers who made money during the wars wonder how long they can survive. The younger men, not so well capitalized, are selling out under pressure from creditors. Non-farm people can realize the nearly hysterical Bensonphobia when they place the situation of these young men against Benson's

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DALE KRAMER, *free-lance magazine writer and author of* Heywood Broun *and other books, will be the Democratic candidate for Congress from Iowa's Fourth District.*

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insistence—by quoting low foreclosure figures—that there are few distress sales. Everybody in the farm regions knows that most sales are distress sales.

The NFO tide is now standing still. One reason is that around April 1 Midwestern farmers rush into their fields and labor all day and part of the night. No major organizational campaign is ever carried on between now and after corn harvest in the autumn.

But there are political whirlpools and a question rises whether the NFO strength will be dissipated before the time for the renewed autumn flow. So far the restless waters have moved in the direction of the Democrats if for no better reason than that the Republicans are in power. Estes Kefauver employed the farm unrest to his advantage. Both Kefauver and his manager, Jiggs Donohue, have stated that Kefauver learned of the strength of the tide at a great rally for him here in Sigourney at the end of February. Thereupon he came out for livestock production payments or "floors" and put another week into his Minnesota schedule.

But the Republicans are not without resources. The Republican sentiments of the grand old man of the NFO, Dan Turner, have by no means disappeared. Dan likes Ike. NFO delegations and Iowa's Republican Congressmen were never able to get past Sherman Adams, but Dan was welcomed by Ike for a chat. Now Dan sings the praise of Eisenhower and the Republican Congressmen who have patted the NFO affectionately. Farmers get up in his meetings to point out that Benson is merely Ike's hired man, but so far they have hesitated to embarrass severely the old patriarch.

The Grangers and the Farmers Alliance (forerunner of the Populists) are supposed to have broken up over political activity. The NFO, while officially non-partisan, is essentially political. And at $1 a membership it is not an organization in the strict sense. It is either a tide or nothing. Whether it can survive the internal pulls over endorsement of candidates nobody knows.

THERE IS a new factor—perhaps the most significant—in the current situation. Farmers are almost despairingly aware of their minority in the nation. In an amazing shift of view they (at least those of the NFO) are seeking the aid of organized labor. In recent weeks segments of the NFO have asked to be taken into labor unions. Labor leaders are in the unhappy position of being forced to rebuff them, pointing out the contradictions of independent farmers as union men, while encouraging friendship between the groups. But a new organization has already been founded on labor union lines, and many observers believe that in time it will spread.

This much is predictable: Unless there is a war or a miracle the waters will be roiling turbulently in the farm belt after the autumn harvest.

Sigourney, Iowa

A FANTASY

King of the Mild Frontier

by JOHN FRANCIS PUTNAM

LIKE MANY bright little boys who are growing up in the wan climate of suburban affluence and anxiety, J. C. Winston is hero hungry. Every evening he sees his father stunning himself with too many Martinis in an attempt to recover from the effects of a day-long struggle in the damp topical brain forest of Merchandising-Television-Point-of-Sales. It is a poor hero indeed who stumbles about in the downstairs rumpus room, J. C. Winston turns silently away.

In just what emulation pattern can this boy form himself, the better to prepare himself for the years ahead? Last year's Davy Crockett and his plastic gadgeteering was a lumbering farce. At the time of the fullest Crockett craze, little J. C. Winston sought with bitter questioning to clarify the issues involved: "Who . . .?" he asked, "was that hairy television idiot Crockett, with his brash attempt to force a spittoon culture on American kids?" "What relevance does that backwoods ape have for *today's* world?"

In search of the definitive hero-image, J. C. Winston would have to look to that remote Federalist Age when an American President, dressed in sober democratic black, could walk unescorted among the citizens, and whisky was a nickel a pint. Surely in that age someone among Gilbert Stuart's rosy-complexioned sitters more worthy than boisterous Crockett might be found.

One evening while J. C. Winston was watching a movie about Alexander Hamilton on television, the quiet and determined image of Aaron Burr appeared on the screen. The shock of recognition was instant and complete: here was the long-awaited hero, the man of "infinite resources and easy scruples."

Several days later young J. C. appeared on the carefully tended lawn of his father's split-level estate, wearing an Aaron Burr suit, complete with claw-hammer jacket, nankeen breeches, a beaver hat and a sword cane. He had taken on the mantle of identification; not for him the crude and sweaty artifacts of the coonskin cap and the rusted Kentucky rifle! It took but a few judicious

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pinkings from the sword cane to convert scoffing playmates into a malleable, other-directed whole. Soon the Aaron Burr cult began to spread out over the expensively landscaped neighborhood, finding its own level, a level of special competence and leadership among the sad-eyed young, for was this not the proper zone of ambition for a rapidly growing junior élite?

This new-found hero was, for one thing, *socially* acceptable, (could you imagine dining with that Crockett slob at the University Club?). And it was obvious that Aaron Burr was the sort of fellow who could think fast in any situation; when things *did* get out of hand, he could, if need be, slash his way out of any outraged director's meeting and start up all over again elsewhere.



The observant traveller in those prosperous latitudes soon came to recognize in the rowdy trainbands of children at play the one cool figure in each group who was there to direct them, a commanding presence, beaver-hatted and aloof.

The virtues inherent in this Aaron Burr complex of tough-mindedness and gentility were immediately recognized by the taste-shapers among the parents of the young *milieu dirigent*. Rebellious little hooligans, reminded by their parents of Aaron's suavity and poise, would mend their manners. Mealtime resisters, reminded of their own Aaron's renown as a connoisseur of fine wines and sauces, evolved overnight into little gourmets. The example of this brooding hero enforced new standards of deportment everywhere.

It was inevitable that television serials, approved comics and cereal-box-top offerings would appear with cautious spontaneity to reinforce and deepen the legend. Insurance companies distributed Aaron Burr booklets to children of policyholders, and all over New England librarians reported increasing thefts of bound volumes of the *Federalist Papers*.

The market was alive. It was a prestige market, aimed at the children whose parents had reached that level of ironic sophistication where they could consider a Cadillac as something funny rather than vulgar. The young hi-fi set was offered an Aaron Burr suite recorded on LP with a score of discreet *kammermusik* reminiscent of Georg Philip Telemann, which evoked for his young admirers the period flavor of their hero's social triumphs in the salons of New York. It was in just this setting that Aaron Burr was featured on the cover of *The American Boy*, working out a slick deal in the sparkling light of the Jumel mansion's Empire chandeliers, while a ring of fragile girls curtsied in a circle about him.

In deference to the junior, junior management crowd a theme song was needed. Agonizingly brought to full diapason by a team of record company executives, musicologists and A & R men, the ballad called for the manly voice of an Alfred Drake. To the vibrant crash of harpsichording in the background of two million pop records, the *Aaron Burr Ballad* reached out to little schemers everywhere:

Aa-ron—Aa-ron Burr, Es-qui-re . . .
Manipulated pioneers!
Born in Newark, New Jer-see,
A proper young conser-vative,
Just like you and me,
Embezzled him a bank
When he was only three!
First slick opera-tor
In hi-iss-to-ree!

Toy counters began featuring the new "furtive look." Each day a new Aaron Burr item entered the market while Davy Crockett surplus was remaindered in dingy shops. A six-month sampling of Burriana by consumer and marketing agencies revealed such items as:

AARON BURR BEAVER HAT
Just like Aaron used to wear! Comes with special brim compartment for concealing incriminating documents.

AARON BURR DERRINGER
Just like the one he shot Hamilton with!

AARON BURR JUNIOR SCHEMER'S KIT
Includes fake wampum for cheating redskins out of ancestral lands; complete set of watered stocks for the Erie Canal; one skillfully forged patent on the invention of the steamboat that antedates Robert Fulton's by TWO years!

AARON BURR LOUISIANA BUBBLE KIT
Includes papers of incorporation for a Louisiana land company, corporate seal, stock certificates, plastic bubble pipe and 6 oz. jar of liquid bubble soap.

The cast-iron sixguns rust in plastic holsters. Spacemen suits hang neglected on closet doors. A carefully shaded lamp burns late in J. C. Winston's room, and the air is overripe with plot as J. C., along with thousands of other solemn little boys all over substantial suburbia, prepare to take on the challenge of responsibility ahead. A new ideal is awake in the land: Look Sharp! Feel Sharp! *BE* Sharp!

And next evening in the quiet of the Winston rumpus room, Uncle Fred, the wealthy advertising man, takes young J. C. up into his lap and asks:

"Just what do *you* want to be when you grow up, Buster?" And the boy glances carefully about the room, consults the notes scribbled on his cuff and answers:

"Me?—I wanna be VICE president!"

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The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy—IV

The Danger of Doing Too Much

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU

THE United States once believed that the Briand-Kellogg Pact was an efficient instrument for the preservation of peace; later, that the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of territorial changes brought about by force could stop the imperialism of Japan; and still later that a piece of domestic legislation forbidding loans to belligerents and the transportation of war materials in American boats could keep the United States out of World War II. Today, we look back on these policies and the state of mind from which they sprang with wonderment and almost with disbelief. What shall we and those who come after us say of our present Asian policies, once the distance of time or reflection has revealed their kinship in futility to their predecessors of the Twenties and Thirties?

The futility of all these policies stems from a thinking which is unable to come to terms with political reality and seeks substitutes in legal and moral abstractions or in self-sufficient technical operations. Sound political thinking requires answers to four fundamental questions: What do we want? Can we get what we want at a price commensurate with the objectives sought? If the answer to this question is negative, how must we revise our objective in order to bring it in line with what is possible and with the price we can afford to pay? Finally, how do we go about getting what we want?

Our Asian policy has given a satisfactory answer to the first of these questions; it has given a partially satisfactory answer to the second and third, and it has largely missed the fourth and most important question.

The immediate objective of our Asian policy is the containment of Russian and Chinese imperialism. Since the Soviet Union and China have used Communism as the main vehicle for the expansion of their power, this objective is of necessity identical with the containment of Communism. It can be sought in two different ways: through the destruction of the Russian and Chinese ability to expand, or by putting an end to their willingness to expand.

The destruction of the ability to expand means to strike at the roots of the political and military power of the Soviet Union and China. This can only be accomplished by all-out war, a course of action which the atomic stalemate rules out as suicidal. We are necessarily limited, then, to depriving Russian and Chinese Communism of opportunities to expand in Asia and creating liabilities and risks which are likely to outweigh the advantages to be gained through expansion. This creation of liabilities and risks can proceed on two different levels of action: military and political.

On the military level we can deprive the prospective enemy of the incentive to attack the vital interests of the United States by way of general deterrence, or we can create local balances of military power where there is the danger of local expansion by military means. We are employing both military techniques successfully. Our ability to counter a military attack upon our vital interests through all-out atomic war has forestalled such an attack. Likewise our ability and willingness to wage local wars in the Formosa Straits, Korea and Viet-Nam has thus far prevented their outbreak.

What is needed beyond these measures is not a hodgepodge of military alliances concluded regardless of their military worth and political consequences. Instead we need the actuality of military power capable and ready to aid in the defense of exposed areas. Such a military policy, in order to have even a chance for success, must have as its instrument a mobile force-in-being stationed outside the Asian continent, and it must not be committed to intervene everywhere or anywhere in particular.

Limitations of Military Containment

ANY LOCALIZED military policy in Asia which is likely to avoid the two extremes of defeat and general war must be conscious of the very narrow limits within which it has a chance to succeed. These conditions are the facts of geography and of the over-all distribution of military power, which are impervious to change short of a general war. For a nation which has ruled out such a general war as a deliberate instrument of national policy, these conditions of geography and military power are the preconditions of policy, not its object.

The experience of the Korean and Viet-Namese Wars has clearly shown the narrow limits which circumscribe

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HANS MORGENTHAU, *director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, recently returned from a tour of the Far East. This is his concluding article on our Asian policy.*

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even defensive military action undertaken by Western powers against an Asian nation supported by the Soviet Union or China. The military defense of any piece of territory located at the rim of the Asian continent by a non-Asian power against one or the other or both of the great Asian land powers is possible only on condition that the latter limit their commitment regardless of the outcome. If the latter press their geographic and local military advantage to the full, local defense becomes impossible, and the alternative is either defeat or a general war.

The Appeal of Communist China

ON THE military plane, our actions, if not our words, have taken into account the narrow limits within which successful action is possible; for the consequences of not taking them into account were so obviously fraught with danger that even the most vociferous supporters of forceful action had to shrink from them. It has been different in the political sphere. For here failure and disaster do not of necessity follow foolish and improvident action as immediate consequences. Thus circumstances have allowed us to act in the political sphere with unconcern for the long-range consequences of specific failures.

Yet our freedom of political action is hemmed in by four circumstances which either cannot be eliminated at all or else can be eliminated only by a general war ruled out by our over-all policy. These circumstances are: the impact of the emancipation and restoration of China, the opportunity for Communist subversion, the suspicion of Western intentions, and the domestic politics of the United States.

Nobody who has recently traveled through Asia with his eyes open can fail to be impressed by the impact which the emancipation of China from Western dependence and the restoration of her power as a nation and as a civilization is making upon all of Asia from Japan to Pakistan. What Asians admire and respect in China is what seems to them the fulfillment of the aspirations of all of Asia: to be masters in their own house and to prove themselves to be the equal, if not the superior, of the West. When Japan in 1942 drove the Western powers from Southeast Asia, she established herself for a fleeting moment, the echoes of which are still audible enough throughout Asia, as the liberator rather than the conqueror of Asia and dealt the prestige of the white man a blow from which it should never recover. Similarly, China, in the teeth of the opposition of the most powerful nation on earth, has given herself a political, social and economic order of her choosing and has defied with a considerable measure of success what appeared to Asia as the combined military strength of the Western world.

This being so, it is impossible for the United States to square a policy of implacable enmity to China with the first objective of its Asian policy: the containment of Communist imperialism. For as this enmity forces China to the side of the Soviet Union, even if other circumstances would not do so anyhow, so that very same enmity forces virtually all of Asia to the side of China. Our enmity toward China becomes a hindrance to the attainment of our objectives in Asia. Yet so strong is China's position that even if we should recognize the Communist government of China and extend the hand of friendship to it, we would only strengthen those very factors which are responsible for China's strong position in Asia in the first place. Thus we are here faced with a condition which our policy must take into account but cannot change, short of the destruction of the Communist government of China.

The same is true of the opportunities for domestic subversion which are throughout Asia at the disposal of Communist China and, to a lesser extent, of the Soviet Union. We have pointed out in a preceding article (*NR*, Mar. 26, 1956) to the spectacular success the Soviet Union and China have had in using the general aspirations and specific grievances of the peoples of Asia for their own purposes. These successes are not primarily due to Communist astuteness, but to the objective conditions which made the exploitation of these aspirations and grievances by Communism almost inevitable while they largely preclude the West from exploiting them. First of all, the Soviet Union and China can count everywhere in Asia upon the support of Communist parties which they control. Furthermore, China, regardless of her ideological coloration and system of government, has traditionally had unique opportunities for exerting influence in the Overseas-Chinese communities. When the Chinese of Malaya and Singapore need protection, to whom should they look if not to China? When the intellectual youth of the Overseas-Chinese communities seek an outlet for their abilities and ambitions, where can they seek it if not in China? China has here an advantage which no competing nation can hope to match.

Mistrust of the West

THE WEST faces another disadvantage which it is not able to change, at least in the short-run: the Asian suspicion of Western intentions. A Western nation coming to Asia comes branded with the stigma of Western colonialism, no matter what its purposes and actions. The wall of hostility and suspicion which dismayed General William Dean when he begged food and shelter from the Koreans whom he had come to liberate and protect constitutes a barrier, insurmountable at least for the time being, to Western influence and policy in Asia.

The intentions and policies of Western nations are doubly suspect in Asia by virtue of their domestic politics. All of Asia is extremely sensitive to the issue of racial equality, and in its relations with the West, the expiration to be free from contempt take precedence over

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all other issues. Every case of racial discrimination in the United States takes on in Asia the aspects of a *cause célèbre*. One has to travel in Asia for some length of time, reading nothing but Asian newspapers, in order to realize to what extent the Asian picture of America is determined by the American attitude on racial equality. For days on end, the only news about America the reader will find deals with racial discrimination and racial violence. Since the elimination of racial discrimination in the United States will inevitably be slow, our policies suffer from a handicap which they, at least in the short-run, cannot escape.

Asians also resent the fact that we take for granted the superiority of democracy as a form of government. Suspicious of all such Western professions of superiority, they are eager to put our sincerity to the test of actual performance. Since the performance cannot fail to fall short of the professed ideal, Asia tends to doubt the United States and all its work. Here, then, we face yet another limitation which domestic policies may diminish but cannot completely erase.

Action That Is Self-Defeating

WHAT FOLLOWS from all this for the Asian policies of the United States?

1. Our Asian policies, on different levels of action, must be subjected to continuous examination in view of our over-all objectives, instead of being examined only in terms of their technical self-sufficiency.

2. No action may be vastly preferable to any kind of action and, more particularly, to action for action's sake.

3. Flexibility, both as to the kind of action and the country to be chosen, must be substituted for the doctrinaire rigidity of our present policies.

It is a peculiarity of the situation in Asia, resulting from the limiting factors mentioned above, that a Western policy, even though successful in its own technical terms, may still fail to bring us closer to the containment of Communism, or may even do the opposite. A military action, successful and even necessary in its own terms, may hold the advance of Communism at the particular spot where it was undertaken, while the very fact of its success and of its having been undertaken by a Western nation brings all of Asia closer to the Communist camp. Nothing needs to be added here to what has been said in preceding articles of the negative political effects which can follow from alliance and foreign-aid policies, successful in their own terms. What is true of all technical policies is true with particular force of our Asian policies: they stand and fall not with their success in their own technical terms, but with the service they render to the attainment of the over-all objective of political policy. Whatever we do or do not do in Asia must answer to this ultimate test: does it serve the immediate objective of our Asian policy, the containment of Communism?

There is no doubt an element of hyperbole in Mr. Acheson's famous statement that we should let the dust settle in Asia. Yet it contains also a great unrecognized truth. For given the insurmountable barriers within which any Western policy is confined in Asia, many an action undertaken by a Western nation is bound to be futile, if not self-defeating, for no other reason than that it is a Western nation which undertakes it. There is not only waste but positive harm in that frenzied activity which is unaware of those insurmountable barriers confining it and feeds on the illusion that ever more and bigger actions cannot fail to surmount them. A passive policy of patient, watchful waiting goes against the grain of the American genius. Yet there is no escape from the necessity to learn how to tread cautiously the narrow path between the Scylla of failure and the Charybdis of universal destruction.

Where there is an aspiration which we can meet or a grievance which we can redress in Asia, we should do so. Where we can extend our military protection with a chance of success and without undue political liabilities, we should do so. But we should stop offering alliances, military support, and economic and technical aid to all who will take them. We should select our allies and the recipients of our aid in view of our interests, rather than suffer to be selected by them in view of theirs.

We must select the place and nature of our Asian policies in view of the opportunities for successful action, and our policies must change with them. Opportunities for politically successful economic aid may disappear in one country, which may instead offer a chance for military support. A chance for a spectacular political or military move may suddenly open up here, to vanish as quickly as it appeared. The statesman must take a leaf out of the book of the military commander who, having at his disposal a great variety of weapons, uses them in ever-changing combinations for the attainment of his over-all objective.

A Realistic Policy of Restraint

THERE IS nothing spectacular in these principles of a sound Asian policy, nothing that is likely to make good copy for the public-relations expert, nothing that lends itself to a flamboyant oratorical demonstration. Yet considering the narrow limits within which we can act in Asia with any chance of success at all, the delicacy of our psychological relations with the peoples of Asia, and sometimes the incompatibility of our policies, it may not be amiss to question whether the interests of the United States are not served best by an Asian policy which is discreet rather than spectacular, restrained rather than indiscriminately active, cautious, pragmatic, and humble rather than confident in its superior principles and technical ability, and not caring who knows it.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Five Who Fear the Future

by George Woodcock

"PROGRESS is the railroad of Liberty," said Proudhon in 1853, using a 19th Century metaphor for a 19th Century thought, and few of his contemporaries would have contradicted him. The onrush of the Industrial Revolution, the spread of evolutionary doctrines in science and history, the messianism of current political theory, all suggested that humanity was proceeding steadily onward, perhaps towards perfection of social organization, perhaps even towards self-transcendence into a more-than-human excellence of character.

There were, indeed, some conservatives who looked with constitutional distrust upon the future, but these were a minority compared with the throng of devotees of Progress among whom the liberals of the Center were distinguished from the radicals of the Left mainly by a disagreement as to how Progress would take place—whether steadily and smoothly by what Sidney Webb once called "the inevitability of gradualness" or jerkily by revolutionary leaps similar to the biologist's mutations, as Kropotkin suggested.

Today Proudhon's railroad of Progress is suffering a remarkable decline of traffic. Its very name is suspect, and not only among Congressional Committees. A Parisian writer recently remarked to me that, up to the Thirties, the most popular name among French bistros was *Bar du Progres,* but that nowadays no tavern-keeper would think of using the name for a new establishment; he would be much more likely to call it *Bar du Bon Vieux Temps.* This attitude reaches far beyond the narrow world of Parisian barkeeps, and much of the significant criticism of the old faith in Progress and of the goals of that faith is coming from intellectuals, and particularly from the radical intelligentsia of Western Europe.

H. G. Wells

IN techniques, goes the familiar argument, there has been an expansion of human powers beyond even the wildest Wellsian dream, but in politics and in human relations generally there seems to have been little advance and, in some important sectors, a dangerous retreat. It is the peril involved in this widening gap between technological complexity and moral stagnation that awakens so many fears, and these fears, it must be observed, did not originate with the atom bomb. The questioning of the dogma of Progress, the erosion of the Utopian vision, began among European writers 30 years before Hiroshima gave it an apocalyptic dimension.

This negative movement of thought has grown so far that it is now possible for the literary critic to detect a whole trend of disillusionment with progressivist ideas, a trend which in the Anglo-Saxon world clusters around some of the most distinguished names of the half-century—Shaw and Wells, Huxley and Orwell and Koestler. Significantly, these writers were—and remained—men of the Left, with quite different standpoints from the conservatives who had hitherto condemned progressivist ideas on reactionary grounds; they have criticized world developments during the 20th Century, not for the changes that have been wrought in the old order, but because the old radical ideals of equality and freedom, far from being promoted, have been put in peril.

Here, however, some distinctions have to be drawn between the various writers I have mentioned. On the one hand, there are the anti-Utopians, Huxley and Orwell, who in reality are not quite so despairing as the pessimism of *Brave New World* and *1984* might at first suggest. On the other hand, there are the ex-Utopians, like Wells and Shaw in the recent past and Koestler in our own day, whose loss of hope, I suggest, is of a much more chronic kind.

I will comment first on the latter group. All its members have held, in the earlier or middle parts of their careers as writers, some kind of Utopian faith, connected intimately with a breakdown of confidence in the efficacy of a democratic ideal founded on ordinary human beings. Fifty years ago, declaring that "Man will return to his idols, in spite of all movements and all revolutions, until his nature is changed," Shaw constructed futurist fantasies about long-lived supermen; Wells, after his disillusionment with Fabian socialism, wrote two romances about elaborately organized "ideal" societies; Koestler, having lost faith in German liberalism, accepted for years that mirage of a perfect social order which



G. B. Shaw

dedicated Communists substitute in their minds for the reality of the USSR.

For all of these men the afflatus of Utopian dreaming was followed by the fall into a second disillusionment. For Shaw, this fall echoes in Saint John's last sorrowing cry, "O God, that madest this beautiful earth, when will it be

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

Arthur Koestler

ready to receive thy saints? How long, O Lord, how long?", and deepens into the sterile political plays of his last years, until, a little while before his death, he declares, "since the dawn of history there has been no change in the natural political capacity of the human species." For Wells, writing *Mind at the End of its Tether* in the gloomy end of his life, it reveals man at a perilous turning point of destiny. "Man must go steeply up or down," he says, "and the odds seem to be all in favor of his going down and out." And Koestler's vision in his latest book, *The Trail of the Dinosaur,* is closely similar. "We shall either destroy ourselves," he says, "or take to the stars." And he gives no convincing reason to suppose that the latter event may materialize.

The despair of writers like these has its roots in their ideological pasts; the placing of hope in a superman of the future, in an imaginary commonwealth, in a Godlike party, already indicates a loss of faith in humanity as it is. The resources of ordinary men are condemned, and trust is placed in the inhuman force of evolution or the impersonal rule of a plan constructed by an infallible élite. But once faith in man is lost, it is not easy to recover. Those who abandon the present for the future, and then lose confidence in the future, are almost doomed to end in pessimistic negation. For these men Proudhon's railroad of Progress ends, not in Liberty, but in a desert where all they can do is to hope for a star. Nor are they merely isolated individuals. Instead, the resurgence of revivalist religion and the vast popularity of the otherworldly fantasies of science fiction writers are phenomena which suggest that men like Wells and Koestler are the intellectual spokesmen of a widespread feeling that, for man as he is, progress has come to an end and only the realm of miracles can offer a solution to his dilemmas.

But if the ex-Utopian represents modern liberal and radical pessimism reaching its extremity in the rejection of man as we have known him, the anti-Utopian presents a different picture, since he stands as the advocate of the human race against the distortion of progress; man is his hero, and man's defeat by the over-development of social and political organization is his tragedy. At first sight, indeed, both *Brave New World* and *1984* seem to present extraordinarily bleak views of our possible future. In both novels the Utopian society is so powerful that it can crush any spark of that spirit of freedom which the rulers recognize as the principal danger to their dominion,

Aldous Huxley

and so the rebellions against uniformity which provide the essential conflicts in both *Brave New World* and *1984* are efficiently defeated. Not only are they defeated, but they never have any real hope of success, since the net of conditioning has already grown so tight that only the sports and the freaks even think of resisting, and they can be dealt with easily by the forces of the all-molding state.

Yet we must bear in mind that the visions contained in both *Brave New World* and *1984* are clearly conditional. Huxley and Orwell do not say gloomily, like Wells and Koestler and Shaw, "Humanity is done for, unless a miracle lifts it towards the heavens." Rather, they suggest that, *if* certain tendencies towards regimentation which have appeared throughout the world are allowed to develop without hindrance, then we may within a foreseeable future find ourselves trapped in a world where freedom, and all the values that go with it, have withered and been forgotten. Huxley puts the argument well when he says:

> Unless we choose to decentralize and to use applied science, not as the end to which human beings are to be made the means, but as the means to producing free individuals, we have only two alternatives to choose from: either a number of national, militarized totalitarianisms . . . or else one supranational totalitarianism . . . developing, under the need for efficiency and stability, into the welfare-tyranny of Utopia.

Brave New World and *1984* are therefore not pessimistic statements of almost certain doom like *Mind at the End of Its Tether.* They are rather parables of warning; they suggest, not that we must quakingly hope for a mutational miracle, but that we have it in our hands, still at this late hour, to ward off the moral blindness that might reproduce the tragedies portrayed in their pages. Even Orwell, despite the apocalyptic terror that broods over *1984,* did not see the catastrophe as inevitable; indeed, in an essay criticizing James Burnham's view of the future, written a little before *1984,* he hinted that, even if the totalitarian nightmare came about, it need not necessarily be final:

> The huge, invincible, everlasting slave empire of which Burnham appears to dream will not be established, or, if established, will not endure, because slavery is no longer a stable basis for human society.

Such a remark seems to indicate that



George Orwell

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the element of apocalyptic fable in *1984* is more than it appears at first sight, and that Orwell overdrew the weakness of the human individual when confronted by the embattled state in order to make us aware of the possible extremity of the perils that confront us rather than of their probable actuality.

Finally, the fact that Orwell and Huxley should have seen worlds without freedom in such ugly terms is not necessarily a measure of their despair; it is rather a measure of their hatred of unfreedom and their anxiety for the perpetuation of freedom itself and its attendant values. Because of this they may well be, among the many Cassandras of our age, those whose voices we should interpret with the greatest care. For, while their books imply a profound criticism of the facile 19th century idea that Progress is inevitable and that all kinds of progress are necessarily good, they are not anti-progressive in an absolute sense; they do not state, as Wells did, that "ordinary man is at the end of his tether." Rather, they insist that changes in technology and in psychiatric methods must be subordinated to certain moral values which man has held for a long time, and that only by this perpetual ascendancy of the moral over the material will Progress in human societies be real.

FOR such a view of Progress, Proudhon's metaphor of the railroad will no longer suffice. Perhaps it can better be likened to one of those pioneer settlements, blossoming on the edge of the waste land, where the careful cultivators stand always ready to defend themselves from the enemies who wait in the desert beyond.

The Self-Improvement of Edward Gibbon

by Peter Quennell

THE ancient Athenians used sometimes to debate, strolling beneath the plane trees or lounging in the portico, whether an unmistakably ugly man could be accounted really happy. On the whole, they were inclined to doubt it:

The Letters of Edward Gibbon, 1750-1794, edited by J. E. Norton (Macmillan, 3 volumes; $30 the set).

Socrates himself (they thought) would probably have preferred to be beautiful as well as wise and virtuous. Today, the ideas of beauty and merit are very much less closely linked; and one striking example in English literary history appears to provide a complete refutation of the pessimistic Athenian point of view. Edward Gibbon was among the ugliest writers whose physiognomy remains on record; but he was also among the happiest, the most diligent and the best organized. Not that he was insensitive to beauty in others, or entirely unaware of his own corporeal shortcomings. Indeed, they were disadvantages that it would have been hard to ignore. His early portraits show us a large puffy face, singularly devoid of youthful charm; in a later portrait, executed when Gibbon was about 36, the encircling jowls have begun to droop and sag, so that the absurd nose and round "button-mouth" seem gradually to be sliding upwards; while, as the sedentary years rolled by, the diminutive body that supported the enormous head became grotesquely piriform, until he waddled or shuffled, instead of walking, and, if he ventured to kneel, found it uncommonly difficult to regain his feet.

Yet envy and malice, the bane of the ill-favored, had little effect on his personal character. True, in his professional capacity, he could be savage enough. Pedantic critics, such as Joseph Priestly and the "wretched Travis," were summarily demolished or contemptuously swept aside. He had a rooted prejudice against the Christian religion, of which he wrote (Richard Porson observed) in the tone of a man whom Christianity had personally injured; and feminine innocence, like religious faith, was a subject that often provoked him to a facile and unpleasing sneer. His humanity never slumbered (Porson continues) "unless when women are to be ravished or the Christians persecuted." But, in the conduct of his personal existence, Gibbon's humanity was a prominent trait —the humanity of an Augustan man of the world, who believed that no emotion should be over-indulged, and that even the most exalted virtues, if they are carried too far, are apt to do more harm than good. In order to contribute to the happiness of mankind, the philosophic worldling must endeavor to perfect himself. Thus, Gibbon performed the social duties that his rank in life imposed on him, paid due respect to a troublesome parent and cultivated the affection of a small company of devoted friends. But whatever his mood and his circumstances, the task of self-improvement came first.

It was not a task that had always proved easy; during the opening period of his existence, he had been callow and ignorant and forlorn and miserable, exiled to a gloomy Swiss parsonage because, in a "momentary glow of enthusiasm" he had suddenly rushed up from Oxford and announced his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church. Only one letter written before his exile appears in Miss J. E. Norton's magnificent edition of Edward Gibbon's correspondence, followed by 24 usually in French or Latin, composed between the summer of 1752, when he reached Switzerland, and May, 1758, when he was finally permitted to travel home.

MEANWHILE, he had been reconverted to Protestantism after strenuous arguments, learned the French language but almost forgotten his native tongue, and had fallen in love with Suzanne Curchod, whom he naïvely hoped that he might be allowed to marry. His hopes were very soon disappointed; and Gibbon bore his disappointment well, announcing his father's decision from England in a letter more sensible and neatly expressed than warmly rebellious or genuinely passionate: *"Puissiez-vous Mademoiselle être plus heureuse que je n'espère d'être jamais! Ce sera toujours ma prière ce sera même ma consolation."* But other consolation was close at hand, and the happiness of which he despaired would gradually suffuse his life. Once Suzanne Curchod had been disposed of, his father greeted him "as a man and a friend," and, having at length been promoted to adult status, he turned his attention, though a little warily, to the fascinating spectacle of public life.

At a later period, the historian was glad to recollect that he had occasionally

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adopted an active role—as the officer of a militia regiment, even though his military associates had "neither the knowledge of scholars nor the manners of gentlemen"; as a Member of Parliament, although he never spoke: and as one of the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, despite the fact that this high-sounding post, which increased his annual income by seven or eight hundred pounds, brought with it very little in the way of duties or responsibilities.

The loss of his comfortable sinecure he owed to the intervention of Edmund Burke, who protested that the Board of Trade was becoming an Academy of Belles Lettres, and said that he wished to demolish the nest so that the imprisoned nightingales might have an opportunity of singing in freedom. Gibbon accepted the hint—here was an excuse that, secretly, he had long desired; and one momentous morning in September, 1783, the chaise that was carrying him towards his beloved Switzerland rumbled over Westminster Bridge. He no more regretted his withdrawal from London than he regretted his modest appearances upon the busy scene of English life. It was something, when he described the thunderous march of a legion, to have shared in the pedestrian exercises of an English regiment: something, when he considered the statesmen of the past, to have listened to the "profuse and philosophic fancy" of Burke and the "argumentative vehemence of Fox," who managed a party (he remembered) with as much energy and skill as if he had been upholding an empire.

Balance was the mental quality that Gibbon valued above all else; and from his instinctive regard for poise and symmetry he derived that remarkable aptitude for making the most of different worlds, which enabled him to construct a world of his own, where, at length, he felt entirely at his ease. Within the shelter that it afforded, he put the last touches to his historical masterpiece, "on the day, or rather night, of the 27th of June, 1787," then strolled forth into the summer moonlight that lay rippling across the Lake of Geneva, pleasantly uplifted by thoughts of the fame he had earned, but saddened at saying goodbye to so old and so agreeable a companion —the immense book that had engrossed him for 17 busy and contented years.

Every stage of this progress is illustrated by his personal letters. Gibbon was not a "great" letter-writer, worthy to rank with Walpole or Byron. The letter, in his hands, was never a form of literary art; and he seems frequently to have begrudged the labor and the time demanded. Some of the specimens of his correspondence collected by Miss Norton, particularly those that deal with his financial affairs, make extremely dull reading. But Gibbon is seldom dull for long; and, provided, of course, that one likes and admires him, one's attention is constantly arrested by some characteristic and rewarding phrase. He may have been solemn, perhaps a trifle self-satisfied; but he did not lack a sense of fun; and his humor was often employed at the expense of Edward Gibbon. The figure in the looking-glass elicited a quizzical—though, it must be added, never a self-pitying or an unkindly—smile. He gently disposes of his pretensions as a courageous and adventurous tourist, observing that

> . . . nothing could have surpassed the pleasantness of our passage over the Mont Cenis. A very fine day, a most romantick variety of prospects, and a perfect consciousness that there could not be the smallest danger.

His studied grandiloquence has often the charm of a game. He chooses a prosaic subject, splendidly inflates it, then, with a single qualificatory sentence, reduces it again to its correct proportions. He said himself that a good style should be a faithful reflection of the man who wrote; and his style, whether it is displayed in his history or in his letters and his autobiographical sketches, reflects the development and crystallization of an individual character. Gibbon's was not a character built upon heroic lines, but it had strength and resilience and human dignity. The complete edition of his correspondence is an admirable piece of literary scholarship, which confirms one's regard for the ungainly author of the spacious and majestic *Decline and Fall*.

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traitriot
—part patriot—part traitor"

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Notes on Contributors

GEORGE WOODCOCK is the author of a recent study of Proudhon. PETER QUENNELL'S newest book is a biography of Hogarth. HOWARD BECKER is a sociologist and a jazz pianist. JOHN PEARSON is a commentator for the British Broadcasting Corporation.

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An Aesthetic of Jazz

by Howard S. Becker

JAZZMEN themselves are not among the world's most flexible people, no matter how disorganized they may look to those on the outside, and every innovation finds some of them clinging stubbornly to past glories. But they are the soul of flexibility in comparison to the fans who devotedly study their work. Every wave of musical innovation leaves behind it a sediment of fans forever committed to the particular form jazz took in their youth, and no other. For the most part, it is the more vociferous of these who have been the authors of such jazz criticism as we have had. Some of them are meticulous historians, carefully searching out the personnel of every known orchestra or recording session. Such scholarship, frequently combined with and directed by a political ("Jazz is the music of the People") or racist ("Only the Negro can play jazz") ideology, has constituted the bulk of such criticism. What remains consists of partisans of one period or another throwing rhetorical rocks at partisans of all other periods.

Jazz: Its Evolution and Essence, by André Hodeir, translated by David Noakes (Grove; $3.50).

These fan-critics are usually musically illiterate or nearly so, while the jazzmen are incapable of putting into words what they understand musically. Consequently, there has never grown up a critical vocabulary which could be used to discuss and analyze the music itself. Criticism has taken the form of rhapsodic statements of simple preference, and nearly always boil down to nothing more than, "I like it!"

André Hodeir, composer, musicologist, jazzmen, and sometime editor of the French journal, *Jazz-Hot,* attempts in this book to rise above this tradition and develop an analysis of jazz as a musical form.

Hodeir believes (rightly, I think) that only a professional musician can speak competently about music. Unfortunately, a person has to be something of a professional in order to read the book. His analyses go into a lot of technical detail and assume a familiarity with recorded jazz from the 1920's to the present. Anyone, for example, who is unfamiliar with the formal structure of the typical jazz tune and the recorded output of Duke Ellington will probably find the chapter analyzing "Concerto for Cootie" tough going. Yet Hodeir is right. This is the only way he can talk sense about the music, and jazz fans who want to understand, rather than merely "appreciate," jazz will have to educate themselves.

Historically, he sees the Swing Era of 1935-1945—the era of Basie and Goodman, Lester Young and Roy Eldridge—as "Classic," a time when the inventions of Louis Armstrong and his predecessors were brought to a synthesis. Having achieved this temporary unity, jazz split into factions; on the one hand, Charlie Parker led the beboppers into more and more daring experiments with rhythm and harmony; on the other, the "cool tendency" embodied in the work of Miles Davis and Gerry Mulligan resulted in a mannered and self-conscious return to the easily melodic style of Lester Young. Although he finds hopeful possibilities in these movements, Hodeir suggests that this revival of the old-fashioned may be a sign that jazz, having reached its culmination in Parker's moody pyrotechnics, is on the road to decadence and ultimate oblivion. Maybe so; but this strikes me as the too easily apocalyptic view of a European.

The last part of the book, dealing with the difficult problems of the nature of improvisation and the essence of jazz, shows the possibilities of a jazz criticism that makes the break with simple name-calling. Hodeir discusses kinds of improvisation, sorts out the choruses which are essentially paraphrases of the melody from those which start from melodic scratch, points out ways in which each kind may be constructed and the characteristic virtues of each variety. He chooses the phenomenon of swing as the crucial characteristic of jazz, tracing it to patterns of relaxation and tension to be found in certain kinds of rhythmic structures. In a really brilliant section, deceptively simple, he points to the importance of "getting the notes in the right place" as a source of swing. The book is in fact the first attempt at a real aesthetic of jazz.

The Negro Potential

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LETTER FROM LONDON

The British Coffee Craze

If a revolution is far-reaching enough, if it really does affect the way in which people live, it is soon difficult to trace its origins. The evidence gets mislaid and before long, no one can quite imagine a time before the revolution began. Although it only occurred quite recently, I think that this may already be happening to the revolution I want to describe. The chief figures in it are a dentist and a film star.

The dentist came from Milan and was trying to market his new espresso coffee machine in Great Britain, and the film star who performed the opening ceremony was Miss Gina Lollobrigida. Capably and firmly she pulled at a handle which was agreeably reminiscent of the handle on a beer pump, and out rushed the first official cup of espresso coffee this side of the Adriatic. This was revolutionary because it meant that good coffee had become once more a big commercial proposition in England.

Being wise after the event I suppose it is easy to understand at least part of the success of the espresso coffee bars, and to look back to any evening in London before 1952 is to realize how few were the places where younger people could go for a cheap night out. There was practically nothing that stayed open after ten o'clock. Dance halls appealed to a limited group and conversation was difficult. Milk bars were dull and uncomfortable, the pubs were worse, and the restaurants presented a daunting world of seemingly inevitable embarrassment, anxiety and expense.

Compared with almost every other means of entertainment the coffee bars were convenient and wonderfully undemanding. Sandwiches, salads, and suitably adapted foreign specialities provided a reasonably priced meal, and nobody complained if you spent an evening over a single coffee. They offered somewhere to sit. That in itself was important, but more important still was the way in which, without demanding any membership, any special friends, or any esoteric knowledge, the bars gave you the illusion that you belonged to the society they represented.

Go into any large coffee bar at the rush hour: Soft lights will soothe you, foreign accents will surround you, cacti will beckon to you, palm fronds may touch your cheek. Half close your eyes and you will be surrounded by all the glamour you remember or would like to have remembered.

For this you will have to thank the handful of designers who evolved the decoration of the first British coffee bars. With a remarkable perception of what was in the air, they found something that exactly suited the mood of post-war younger England. They brought the jungle back into catering. There was greenery and lushness and warmth and an emphasis in the decor and the dishes on places like Italy and Mexico where life is supposed to be fuller and hotter.

The interesting thing is that this style is not exactly uniform. It varies, as do the bars themselves, from place to place, and it always has an emphasis on some particular country abroad. In London's Soho inevitably it is Italy, and in the bars there will almost certainly be Italian waitresses, Italian dishes and a radio somewhere playing "Come back to Sorrento." Hampstead seems to have a slight tendency towards Spain, and the North of Oxford Street towards France, but as far as coffee bars go, Knightbridge is the new cosmopolis. In Knightbridge you can drink your espresso coffee in surroundings reminscent of Cuba, of Arabia, or even of China.

There are few signs that the craze is coming to an end. But I am sure that their success goes far deeper than any talk of "crazes" would account for. And if the bars are nothing more than a passing fashion, they must have won their customers from some other form of entertainment, but what form of entertainment could it be? The motion picture houses, the dance-hall, the small club, or the pub? The movies is a possibility, but there has not been a fall in film going during the last three years sufficient on its own to account for the numbers the bars are still attracting. And a single visit to a coffee bar will disprove the other hypotheses. Most of the people you will see sipping their espressos are not the sort you would find in the saloon bar or trying out a tango at the Hammersmith Palais, and if they have been lured away from anywhere, it must have been from their own homes.

For the majority of young city workers who frequent them, the bars provide some alternative to the boredom of the suburbs or the loneliness of a bedsitter in Earle Court or Bayswater. They offer warmth, a little escapist glamour, an evening's luxury on the cheap, and little else.

But as well as these people, there is also a minority, a sort of coffee bar intelligentsia for whom some of the bars seem to serve as a substitute for the student life they never had or wish to prolong. They form a strange band, a sort of ghost intelligentsia—an intelligentsia without a creed or a writer, a martyr or a leader. The one thing that provides them their unity as a group and their identity as individuals is their appearance. They are an intelligentsia founded almost entirely upon clothes.

The girls with their unlipsticked mouths, straight hair and heavily shadowed eyes, and the men with their black jeans and crew-cuts are obvious copies of the student fashions that were popular in Paris at the end of the war. The entire pose seems to be an attempt to make the most of the last ripple from the splash which was excited ten years ago by Jean-Paul Sartre.

Whatever it may be that provides an active café life this emphatically is not it. But all the same I don't think you can leave it at that. There is something of the same slightly pathetic appeal about the coffee bar movement as there is sometimes in the attempts of a backward people to imitate the form and method of some particularly complex foreign institution or way of government. And there is a certain parallel between the enthusiastic misunderstanding of parliamentary democracy which has occurred abroad from time to time, with the enthusiasm with which the crowds in the London coffee bars have been trying to follow the cafe life and the student life of the continent. Before this nobody seemed to have been able to convince the English that an evening could be spent in a cafe.

JOHN PEARSON

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

others that Senator Kefauver will win in California. I will be braver. He will win by about two to one.

CHARLES ALLDREDGE

Washington, D. C.

". . . an old-time trick"

. . . We are terribly distressed over the Republicans voting for Kefauver in Minnesota which is an old-time trick of the GOPs when they have nothing to lose (as in this instance). They are trying to defeat the stronger candidate, which we feel shows fully that the GOPS think Ike can be beaten by Stevenson.

The Democrats around here are "up in arms" . . . and are forming separate "Stevenson for President" clubs.

MRS. R. E. BROWN

Carmel-by-the-Sea, Calif.

". . . no enthusiasm for Adlai"

I am a Democrat Township Supervisor here in Shelby County and I wish to tell you that here and in many other spots over the state the feeling is the same: no enthusiasm for Adlai. This state would not go for him any more, if as much, as Minnesota did. . . .

OLLIE BAUGHER

Windsor, Illinois

". . . his views are more reasonable"

I voted for Adlai Stevenson in '52, nd I sincerely hope I have the privilege to vote for him again in November. I am convinced his views are more reasonable, nore workable and less political than all he others.

MRS. GENEVA FINNEY

Idabel, Oklahoma

". . . rejected as wanting"

I was more than amused by your article of April 2 on Adlai Stevenson, first for its blatant apologies for your sinking hero; second, for its unfounded generalities. (When did Estes Kefauver ever show vulnerability in a general election? He always won.)

Your statement that "If Stevenson communicates his ideas, and is defeated, then 1956 is not his time." Why not be honest and face up to the facts? Stevenson has written books, talked his head off, used every means of communication known to man, and been *rejected* as wanting.

Your own description of the man is the answer. He is according to you "urbane, sophisticated, aloof, eloquent, Olympian in his principle," in brief, the bald-headed *Dewey* of the Democratic Party.

If nominated, it will be a sure tip-off that the National Democratic Organization has conceded the election in advance. So we'll all just sit on our hands and let the Cadillac crowd ride by.

JAMES E. DUREE

Raymond, Washington

The New Republic *welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.*

► *Constitutional Monarch*

SIRS:

I agree with Mr. Feld's comparison of President Eisenhower to a Constitutional Monarch (*NR*, March 26). The President, by reason of his unique personal popularity and coincident physical limitations, would be an ideal titular President. Such a role would conform with his tastes and personality and be commensurate with his status as a national hero. He would be free to spend as much time as he liked with personal interests and leisure, limited only by his duties as Chief of State.

The business of government would be conducted in his name, yet he would be relieved of the personal responsibility for decisions as to policy and administration. These duties would be handled by a Parliamentary Cabinet, under the leadership of a "Prime Minister" or Executive Secretary, who would also be the Majority Leader of Congress (unicameral), and the acknowledged leader of his party.

The President would still enjoy considerable influence in matters of policy and legislation by means of his prestige and a token veto power.

Voters who prefer to vote for "the man" could enjoy the satisfaction of electing their hero President, without running the danger of acting contrary to their own best interests. In other words, they could have their "Ike" and eat it too.

J. W. MILLER

Billings, Montana

► *The Objectives of Foreign Aid*

SIRS:

Dr. Hans Morgenthau believes, with the Isolationists, that American foreign aid policy has been wasteful and almost useless. But instead of dropping foreign aid, he proposes to change its objectives. Whereas certain military and economic aims have been achieved, he deplores the lack of undefined political and social results. So he suggests we use our loans and grants "to interfere with the political processes of the foreign country." Yet he criticizes the current policy for raising "the spectre of Western imperialism"!

The Eisenhower administration has finally seen the wisdom of Truman's "bold new policy." Whatever one may think of certain past utterances of Secretary Dulles, his experiences on the brink of war have taught him something. His most recent address, especially his discussion of the so-called neutral countries, was wise and enlightening. But Dr. Morgenthau, with his "political discipline" has devised a fine scheme for losing friends and annoying neighbors.

Our ultimate objective is strengthening the sentiment for democracy, but our immediate purpose is to assist local plans for economic and social progress, not to dictate policies.

WM. C. MALLALIEU

University of Louisville

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